We present a model of the connection between real interest rates, credit spreads, and the structure and the risk of the banking system. Banks intermediate between entrepreneurs and investors, and choose the monitoring intensity on entrepreneurs' projects. We …rst characterize the equilibrium for a …xed aggregate supply of savings, showing that safer entrepreneurs will be funded by nonmonitoring (shadow) banks and riskier entrepreneurs by monitoring (traditional) banks. We also show that a savings glut reduces interest rates and spreads, increases the relative size of the shadow banking system and the probability of failure of the traditional banks. The dynamic version of the model provides a framework for understanding the emergence of endogenous boom and bust cycles, as well as the procyclical nature of the shadow banking system, the existence of countercyclical risk premia, and the low levels of interest rates and spreads leading to the buildup of risks during booms.
Introduction
The connection between interest rates and …nancial stability has been the subject of extensive discussions and a signi…cant amount of (mostly empirical) research. This paper contributes to this literature by constructing a theoretical model of the relationship between real interest rates, credit spreads, and the structure and the risk of the banking system. It thus provides a framework to understand how a "global savings glut" that reduces the level of long-term real interest rates, noted by Bernanke (2005) and Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008) , can generate incentives to "search for yield" and increases of risk-taking that can lead to …nancial instability, as noted by Rajan (2005) and Summers (2014) .
The model shows that an increase in savings reduces interest rates and interest rate spreads, increases the relative size of the originate-to-distribute (shadow) banking system, and increases the probability of failure of the originate-to-hold (traditional) banks. 1 Moreover, the model generates endogenous boom and bust cycles: the accumulation of savings leads to a reduction in rates and spreads and an increase in risk-taking that eventually materializes in a bust, which reduces savings, starting again the process of wealth accumulation that leads to a boom. The model also yields a number of empirically relevant results such as the procyclical nature of risk-taking in the traditional banking system, the procyclicality of the shadow banking system, and the existence of countercyclical risk premia. These …ndings contribute to our understanding of the role of …nancial factors in economic ‡uctuations.
The paper starts with a simple partial equilibrium model of bank lending with three types of risk-neutral agents: entrepreneurs, investors, and a bank. Entrepreneurs seek bank …nance for their risky investment projects. The bank, in turn, needs to raise funds from a set of (uninsured) investors. Following Holmström and Tirole (1997) , the bank can monitor the entrepreneurs'projects at a cost, which reduces their probability of default. As monitoring is not contractible there is a moral hazard problem. We characterize the optimal contract between the bank and the investors, showing that there are circumstances in which the bank chooses not to monitor entrepreneurs and others in which it chooses to monitor them. We associate the …rst case to (shadow) banks that originate-to-distribute, and the second case to (traditional) banks that originate-to-hold.
The partial equilibrium results show that which case obtains depends on the spread between the bank's lending rate and the expected return required by the investors, which under risk-neutrality equals the safe rate. In particular, a reduction in this spread reduces monitoring, and makes it more likely that the bank will …nd it optimal to originate-todistribute.
To endogenize interest rates and interest rate spreads we embed our model of bank …nance into a static general equilibrium model in which a large set of heterogeneous entrepreneurs, that di¤er in their observable risk type, seek funding for their investment projects from a competitive banking sector. Assuming that the higher the total investment in projects of a particular risk type the lower the return, we characterize the equilibrium for a …xed aggregate supply of savings, and show that safer entrepreneurs will borrow from originate-to-distribute banks while riskier entrepreneurs will borrow from originate-to-hold banks.
We then analyze the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the aggregate supply of savings,
showing that it will lead to a reduction in interest rates and interest rate spreads, an increase in investment and in the size of banks'lending to all types of entrepreneurs, an expansion of the relative size of the shadow banking system, and a reduction in the monitoring intensity and hence an increase in the probability of failure of the traditional banks. These results provide a consistent explanation of a number of stylized facts of the period preceding the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis; see, for example, Brunnermeier (2009) .
Although we focus on the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the supply of savings, the same e¤ects obtain when there is an exogenous decrease in the demand for investment, due for example to a negative productivity shock. Thus, the model provides an explanation of the way in which changes leading to a reduction in the equilibrium real rate of interest, as those noted by Summers (2014) , can be linked to an increase in …nancial instability.
Next we consider three extensions of our static model. First, we show that the e¤ect of a savings glut on …nancial stability critically depends on the increase in the size of the traditional banks. When banks that originate-to-hold cannot increase their balance sheet (and adjust their loan rates), there will be a greater increase in the size of the shadow banking system, a greater reduction in the safe rate, and wider spreads for the traditional banks, so they will become safer. The assumption of a …xed size may be rationalized in terms of some capacity constraint that cannot be immediately relaxed. But as soon as originate-to-hold banks are able to expand they will become riskier. This result allows us to distinguish between the short-and the long-run e¤ects of a savings glut, and provides a rationale for the idea that the buildup of risks in the traditional banking sector happens when (real) interest rates are "too-low for too-long."
The second extension deals with the case where investors are risk-averse. We show that a reduction in risk aversion has similar e¤ects as a savings glut except for the level of the safe rate, which goes up instead of down. This provides a simple way to empirically distinguish a savings glut from a reduction in investors'risk appetite. The intuition is that when investors are less risk-averse, there is a shift in investment toward riskier entrepreneurs that reduces the funds available for safer ones. This leads to a reduction in loan rates for the former and an increase in loan rates for the latter, which reduces spreads and hence banks'monitoring incentives.
The third extension analyzes a variation of the model in which the riskiest entrepreneurs may not be able to fund their projects. In this setup, a savings glut will expand the set of (riskier) entrepreneurs that get funded.
Finally, we consider a dynamic version of the static model in which investors are in…nitely lived and the aggregate supply of savings is endogenous. Speci…cally, the supply of savings at any date is the outcome of agents' decisions at the previous date together with the realization of a systematic risk factor that a¤ects the return of entrepreneurs' projects.
For good realizations of the risk factor, aggregate savings will accumulate leading to lower interest rates and spreads, which translate into higher risk-taking and a fragile …nancial system. In this situation the economy is especially vulnerable to a bad realization of the risk factor, which can lead to a crisis. The associated reduction in aggregate savings leads to higher interest rates and spreads, which translate into lower risk-taking and a safer …nancial system. Then savings will grow, restarting the process that leads to another boom. In this manner, the model generates endogenous boom and bust cycles.
The dynamic model yields other interesting and potentially testable results. First, interest rates and interest rate spreads are countercyclical. Second, during booms the safe rate may be below investors'subjective discount rate, and it may even be negative. Third, the shadow banking system is highly procyclical. Fourth, even though investors are risk-neutral, they behave as if they were risk-averse, so risky assets have positive risk premia. Fifth, even though investors'preferences do not change over time, such risk premia are countercyclical.
The brief review of the literature that follows discusses the relation to previous studies and the evidence on some of these predictions.
Literature review This paper is linked to di¤erent strands of the (theoretical and empirical) literature on the relationship between interest rates, …nancial frictions, the structure of the …nancial system, and the business cycle.
Our interest in the e¤ects of …nancial frictions on macroeconomic activity relates to numerous studies following the seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . 2 We have chosen to introduce these frictions using the moral hazard setup of Holmström and Tirole (1997) . We depart from their model by focussing exclusively on the banks'moral hazard problem, endogeneizing the return structure that entrepreneurial projects o¤er in a competitive setup, and introducing heterogeneity in the ex-ante risk pro…le of entrepreneurs instead of in their net worth. In their characterization of equilibrium, entrepreneurs with low net worth borrow from monitoring banks while those with high net worth are directly funded by the market. In contrast, in our setup riskier entrepreneurs borrow from monitoring banks while safer entrepreneurs borrow from nonmonitoring banks, which could be interpreted as market …nance.
Most papers that analyze the role of …nancial intermediaries in economic ‡uctuations focus on leverage; see, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , Repullo and Suarez (2013) , and Adrian and Shin (2014) . We depart from this literature by considering a model in which banks have no equity capital. Our focus on the e¤ect of endogenously determined interest rates on banks'decisions in a general equilibrium setting links our …ndings to those of Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2015) . They analyze a model with an interbank market where lower interest rates make riskier banks more prone to borrow from safer banks. Their paper, like ours, generates endogenous boom and bust cycles which are driven by banks'strategic responses to changes in interest rates. But we ignore the interbank market, and focus on the e¤ect of interest rates on banks 'monitoring decisions. 3 Our work is related to a large volume of research spurred following the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis. On the one hand, our paper provides a theoretical framework that links a savings glut with the level of interest rates and the increases in risk-taking noted by Rajan (2005) and
Summers (2014) among many others. On the other hand, it yields some predictions regarding the behavior of interest rates and spreads, risk premia, and the structure and the risk of the banking system that are in line with recent empirical …ndings. For example, Lopez-Salido, Stein and Zakrajšek (2015) show that the widening of credit spreads following a period of low spreads is closely tied to a contraction in economic activity. 4 Our results on risk premia are also in line with Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , who …nd a negative relationship between risk premia and economic activity, and Muir (2014) , who …nds that risk premia increase substantially in …nancial crises. Finally, our results on the procyclicality of shadow banking are consistent with the evidence in Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2012) .
Many empirical papers analyzing the link between interest rates and banks'risk-taking focus on monetary policy. Although we have a real model without nominal frictions, some of this evidence is also in line with our predictions; see, for example, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) , Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2014), Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2014) , and Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro (2015) . Interestingly, our paper provides a rationale for the idea that low interest rates are dangerous from a …nancial stability perspective when they are low for a long period of time. However, our story is driven by the behavior of real interest rates, and is therefore not necessarily related to the stance of monetary policy.
Structure of the paper Section 2 presents the partial equilibrium model of bank …nance under moral hazard. Section 3 embeds the partial equilibrium model into a general equilibrium setup, characterizing the equilibrium for a …xed aggregate supply of savings and analyzing the e¤ects of an increase in the supply of savings. Section 4 considers three extensions of the general equilibrium model, which allow us to discuss the possible di¤erences between the short-and long-run e¤ects of a savings glut, the e¤ect of having risk-averse instead of risk-neutral investors, and the way in which a savings glut can expand the set of (riskier) entrepreneurs that get funded. Section 5 analyzes the dynamic version of the model that generates endogenous booms and busts, and Section 6 concludes. The proofs of the analytical results are in the Appendix.
Partial Equilibrium
Consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1); a large set of potential entrepreneurs, a large set of risk-neutral investors, and a single risk-neutral bank. Entrepreneurs have investment projects that require external …nance, which can only come from the bank. The bank, in turn, needs to raise funds from the investors, which are characterized by an in…nitely elastic supply of funds at an expected return equal to R 0 :
Each entrepreneur has a project that requires a unit investment at t = 0 and yields a c 00 (m) > 0; and c 000 (m) 0: A special case that satis…es these assumptions and will be used for our numerical results is the quadratic function
where > 0: We assume that monitoring is not observed by the investors, so there is a moral hazard problem.
The bank can only fund a limited set of projects, taken to be just one for simplicity.
Thus, entrepreneurs will be in the short side of the market and so they will only be able to borrow at the rate R that leaves them no surplus.
There are two possible modes of …nance. The bank can keep the loan until maturity (originate-to-hold) or sell it to the investors (originate-to-distribute). We assume that the bank sells the loan when it is indi¤erent between keeping and selling it. Since monitoring is costly, and it is not observed by the investors, the bank will never monitor the entrepreneur when it is going to sell the loan, because it will get no compensation for its monitoring. Hence, originate-to-hold obtains when it is optimal for the bank to monitor the entrepreneur (i.e. set m > 0), and originate-to-distribute obtains when the bank prefers to do no monitoring (i.e. set m = 0).
To characterize the optimal mode of …nance, suppose that the bank borrows from the investors at a rate B, chooses a monitoring intensity m 2 [0; p]; and lends to the entrepreneur at the rate R.
An optimal contract between the bank and the investors is a pair (B ; m ) that solves
subject to the bank's incentive compatibility constraint
the bank's participation constraint
and the investors'participation constraint
The incentive compatibility constraint (4) characterizes the bank's choice of monitoring m given the promised repayment B ; and the participation constraints (5) and (6) ensure that the bank makes nonnegative pro…ts, net of the monitoring cost, and that the investors get the required expected return on their investment.
An interior solution to (4) is characterized by the …rst-order condition R B c 0 (m ) = 0:
Solving for B in the participation constraint (6), substituting it into the …rst-order condition (7), and rearranging gives the equation
Since we have assumed c 000 (m) 0; the function in left-hand side of this equation is convex in m: Let R denote the minimum value of this function in the feasible range [0; p]; that is
The following result shows the condition under which bank …nance is feasible and characterizes the corresponding optimal contract between the bank and the investors.
Proposition 1 Bank …nance is feasible if R R; in which case the optimal contract between the bank and the investors is given by
Proposition 1 shows that bank …nance is feasible if the lending rate R is gretare than or equal to the minimum value R de…ned by (9), in which case the optimal contract is characterized by the highest value of m that satis…es c 0 (m) + R 0 1 p + m R:
Figure 1. Characterization of the optimal contract
Panel A shows a case in which the optimal contract may entail zero monitoring (dashed line), and Panel B a case where the optimal contract always has positive monitoring.
Monitoring in the optimal contract may be at the corner with zero monitoring m = 0; at the corner with full monitoring m = p; or it may be interior m 2 (0; p): The …rst case corresponds to the originate-to-distribute mode of …nance, while the second and third cases correspond to the originate-to-hold mode of …nance. Figure 1 illustrates the two modes of …nance for the quadratic monitoring cost function.
Panel A shows a case where the slope of the function in left-hand side of (8) is positive at the origin, in which case the optimal contract may entail m = 0 (for R = R). Panel B shows a case where the slope of this function is negative at the origin, in which case the optimal contract always entails m > 0:
We next derive some interesting comparative static results on the optimal contract, assuming that it involves an interior level of monitoring.
Proposition 2 If R > R we have @m @R 0 < 0 and @m @R > 0:
Thus, a reduction in the spread R R 0 ; due to either an increase in the funding cost R 0 or a decrease in the lending rate R; reduces optimal monitoring, thereby increasing the bank's portfolio risk. For su¢ ciently low spreads, the bank may …nd it optimal to choose zero monitoring, switching from originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute. Figure 1 illustrates the second result in Proposition 2: whenever bank …nance is feasible, a reduction in the lending rate R (from the dotted to the dashed lines) always reduces monitoring m :
Summing up, we have presented a partial equilibrium model of bank …nance under moral hazard that shows that banks'monitoring incentives and hence banks'portfolio risk depends on the spread between lending and borrowing rates. A reduction in the spread reduces monitoring, and makes it more likely that the bank will …nd it optimal to originate-to-distribute. However, the model assumes that interest rates are exogenous. To construct a model of the search for yield phenomenon we need to endogenize these rates, to which we turn now.
General Equilibrium
This section embeds our partial equilibrium model of bank …nance into a general equilibrium setup in which a set of heterogeneous entrepreneurs seek …nance for their risky projects. We characterize the equilibrium for a …xed aggregate supply of savings, showing that safer entrepreneurs will borrow from originate-to-distribute (shadow) banks while riskier entrepreneurs will borrow from originate-to-hold (traditional) banks. We then analyze the e¤ects of an increase in the supply of savings, showing that it will lead to a reduction in interest rates and interest rate spreads, and an increase in the risk of the banking system.
Consider an economy with two dates (t = 0; 1) and a large set of potential entrepreneurs with observable types p 2 [0; 1]: Entrepreneurs have investment projects that require external …nance, which can only come from banks. Banks are risk-neutral agents that specialize in lending to speci…c types of entrepreneurs. To simplify the presentation, we will assume that for each type p there is a single bank that only lends to entrepreneurs of this type. 5 Banks, in turn, need to raise funds from a set of investors, which are characterized by a …xed aggregate supply of savings w.
5 Without loss of generality, we could have many banks lending to each type of entrepreneur. What might be restrictive is the assumption of bank specialization. However, Repullo and Suarez (2004) show that, for a model with insured deposits, limited liability implies that it is optimal for banks to specialize.
Each entrepreneur of type p has a project that requires a unit investment at t = 0 and yields a stochastic return e R p at t = 1 given by e R p = ( R p ;
0;
with probability 1 p + m; with probability p m;
where m 2 [0; p] is monitoring intensity of its bank. As before, monitoring is costly and the monitoring cost c(m) satis…es our previous assumptions. We assume that the success return R p is a decreasing function R(x p ) of the aggregate investment of entrepreneurs of type p; denoted x p : Thus, the higher the aggregate investment x p the lower the return R p :
This assumption may be rationalized by introducing a representative consumer with a CES utility function over the continuum of goods produced by entrepreneurs of types [0; 1]:
As originally shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , in this case the demand of goods of type p takes a simple functional form. Speci…cally, assuming a linear production function that transforms (in case of success) a unit of investment into units of output, the equilibrium price R p is determined by the condition x p = (R p ) ; where > 1 denotes the (constant) elasticity of substitution between any two goods. 6 From here it follows that
This function will be used to derive the numerical results of the paper.
If the bank lending to entrepreneurs of type p sets a loan rate L p ; then a measure x p of such entrepreneurs will enter the market until L p = R p = R(x p ): Thus, as in the partial equilibrium setup, entrepreneurs will only be able to borrow at a rate that leaves them no surplus.
To determine equilibrium loan rates, we assume that the loan market is contestable. Thus, although there is a single bank that lends to each type, the incumbent could be undercut by an entrant if it were pro…table for the entrant to do so.
Finally, to simplify the presentation, we assume that the returns of the projects of entrepreneurs of each type p are perfectly correlated (but we could have correlation across di¤erent types; see Section 5). This implies that the bank's return per unit of loans is identical to the individual project return, which is given by (11).
The strategy for the analysis is going to be as follows. First, we characterize the investment allocation corresponding to any given safe rate R 0 ; which is derived from the condition that investors must be indi¤erent between funding banks lending to entrepreneurs of di¤erent types. Then we introduce the market clearing condition that equates the aggregate demand for investment to the aggregate supply of savings to determine the equilibrium safe rate R 0 :
By contestability, a bank lending to entrepreneurs of type p = 0 will set a rate equal to the return R 0 of their projects, since at a lower rate it will make negative pro…ts and at a higher rate it will be undercut by another bank. Similarly, banks lending to entrepreneurs of types p > 0 will set the lowest feasible rate, which by Proposition 1 (together with the perfect correlation assumption) is given by
The assumptions on the monitoring cost function c(m) imply that we have a corner solution with zero monitoring if and only if
Thus, banks lending to (safer) entrepreneurs of types p b p will originate-to-distribute, and banks lending to (riskier) entrepreneurs of types p > b p will originate-to-hold. In what follows we will assume that R 0 < c 00 (0); so b p 2 (0; 1): 7
The intuition for this result is that since monitoring is especially useful for riskier entrepreneurs, they will have an incentive to borrow from originate-to-hold (monitoring) banks, and since monitoring is less useful for safer entrepreneurs (and useless for those with p = 0); they will borrow from originate-to-distribute (nonmonitoring) banks. 7 The model also works with R 0 c 00 (0); but in this case monitoring is so pro…table that no bank (except the one lending to safe entrepreneurs of type p = 0) would originate-to-hold.
For banks that originate-to-distribute (p b p) loan rates are given by
where we have used the assumption c 0 (0) = 0: This result implies (1 p)R p = R 0 ; so the expected return of the banks' investments equals the funding cost. Thus, pro…ts in the originate-to-distribute mode of …nance will always be zero.
For banks that originate-to-hold (p > b p) loan rates are given by
where the monitoring intensity m p satis…es the …rst-order condition 8
This result implies
where we have used (16) and the fact that m p c 0 (m p ) > c(m p ) by the convexity of the monitoring cost function. Thus, pro…ts in the originate-to-distribute mode of …nance will always be positive.
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 3 For any given safe rate R 0 < c 00 (0); there exists a marginal type b p 2 (0; 1)
given by (14) such that banks lending to entrepreneurs of types p b p will originate-todistribute, and banks lending to entrepreneurs of types p > b p will originate-to-hold. Higher types p will be characterized by higher spreads R p R 0 and (for p > b p) higher monitoring m p : Moreover, increases in the safe rate R 0 will lead to a reduction in the marginal type b p;
an increase in spreads R p R 0 , and (for p > b p) an increase in monitoring m p :
Thus, for a given safe rate R 0 , spreads and monitoring intensities are higher for riskier entrepreneurs, and they are both increasing in the safe rate.
We are now ready to de…ne an equilibrium, which requires to specify the investment x p of the di¤erent types of entrepreneurs, and hence the rates R p = R(x p ) at which they will borrow. By our previous results, both will be a function of the equilibrium safe rate R 0 :
Formally, an equilibrium is an investment allocation x p p2[0;1] and corresponding loan interest rates R p = R(x p ) such that loan rates satisfy
and the market clears Z 1 0
x p dp = w:
Condition (18) follows from the assumption that the market for lending to entrepreneurs of each type p is contestable, so equilibrium loan rates will be at the lowest feasible level R p implied by the equilibrium safe rate R 0 : Condition (19) ensures that the aggregate demand for investment is equal to the aggregate supply of savings w: Notice that the investors' participation constraint ensures that they all get the same expected return R 0 ; regardless of the type of bank they fund.
The equilibrium marginal type will be given by
We will restrict attention to (su¢ ciently high) values of w so that R 0 < c 00 (0) and p 2 (0; 1):
An increase in the supply of savings
To analyze the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the supply of savings w notice that the market clearing condition (19) may be written as
and R p is increasing in R 0 by Proposition 3, we have F 0 (R 0 ) < 0; which implies
Hence, an increase in the aggregate supply of savings w leads to a decrease in the safe rate R 0 and consequently in the rates R p charged to entrepreneurs of all types p: This, in turn, implies a higher investment x p for all types p:
Since the marginal type p in (20) is decreasing in the equilibrium safe rate R 0 ; the originate-to-distribute region will be larger. Moreover, by Proposition 3 the increase in w will reduce the monitoring intensity m p of originate-to-hold banks, so they will be riskier.
We can summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 4 An increase in the aggregate supply of savings w leads to 1. A reduction in the safe rate R 0 and in the loan rates R p of all types of entrepreneurs.
2. An increase in investment x p and hence in the size of banks' lending to all types of entrepreneurs.
3. An expansion of the range [0; p ] of entrepreneurs that borrow from banks that originateto-distribute, and a shrinkage of the range [p ; 1] of entrepreneurs that borrow from banks that originate-to-hold.
4.
A reduction in interest rate spreads R p R 0 :
5. An reduction in the monitoring intensity m p (and hence an increase in the probability of failure p m p ) of originate-to-hold banks.
We can illustrate these results for the case where the monitoring cost function is given by (2) and the relationship between the success return R p and the aggregate investment of entrepreneurs of type p is given by (12).
When the monitoring cost function is quadratic, solving the …rst-order condition (17) we obtain the following equilibrium monitoring intensity of originate-to-hold banks
This implies p m p = p ; so all banks that originate-to-hold have the same probability of failure, which equals the type p of the marginal entrepreneur. Thus, in this case p fully characterizes the risk of the banking system. (16) gives the following equilibrium loan rates for types p > p R p = (p p ) + R 0 1 p :
Substituting this result in
Thus, with the quadratic monitoring cost function, equilibrium loan rates R p (and spreads R p R 0 ) for originate-to-hold banks are linear in the risk type p: implies that banks lending to entrepreneurs of types slightly above p will have an incentive to reduce their monitoring. But since m p is close to zero they will move to a corner solution with m p = 0; so the originate-to-distribute region will expand.
Panel A shows the e¤ect on equilibrium loan rates. The increase in w shifts downwards the function R p to R p : The intercept of these functions is the interest rate charged to entrepreneurs of type p = 0 (the safe rate), which goes down from R 0 to R 0 : To the left of the marginal types p and p ; loan rates are convex in p (and given by (15)), while to the right of these points they are linear (and given by (22)).
Panel B shows the e¤ect on equilibrium investment allocations. The increase in w shifts upwards the function x p to x p : The total amount of lending by banks that originate-todistribute is clearly increasing, since banks that were initially using this mode of …nance will increase their lending, and some banks that were monitoring their borrowers are now originating-to-distribute. The e¤ect on the total amount of lending by banks that originateto-hold is in principle ambiguous, because fewer banks monitor their borrowers although they become bigger. In our parameterization, lending by banks that originate-to-hold is also increasing, but the proportion of total lending that is accounted for by them goes down. In other words, these results show that a savings glut increases the relative size of the originateto-distribute (shadow) banking system. Panel C shows the e¤ects on equilibrium spreads. As stated in Proposition 4, interest rate spreads go down from R p R 0 to R p R 0 : Since equilibrium loan rates for originate-to-hold banks are linear in p with a slope equal to (see (22)), it follows that for types riskier than p spreads will be reduced by a constant amount.
Finally, Panel D shows the e¤ect on equilibrium probabilities of bank failure. The shift of entrepreneurs with types in the interval between p and p from monitoring to nonmonitoring banks means that their probability of default will go up. Also, banks that originate-to-hold will increase their probability of failure from p m p = p to p m p = p > p : Thus, the increase in the aggregate supply of savings w has an extensive margin e¤ect due to the shift of originate-to-distribute banks toward riskier entrepreneurs (shown by the horizontal arrow), and an intensive margin e¤ect due to the reduction in the intensity of monitoring by originate-to-hold banks (shown by the vertical arrow). Hence, we conclude that a savings glut increases the risk of the banking system.
We have so far analyzed the e¤ects of an exogenous shock to the supply of savings w.
However, one can show that the same e¤ects obtain when there is an exogenous decrease in the demand for investment, which in the context of our model could be simply captured by an increase in parameter of the inverse demand for loans (12) . Substituting this function into the market clearing condition (19) gives Z 1 0
x p dp = 1 Z 1 0 R p dp = w:
Clearly, equilibrium allocations depend on the product w; so we conclude that the e¤ects of an increase in the aggregate supply of savings are identical to the e¤ects of a proportional fall in the demand for investment.
Summing up, we have embedded a partial equilibrium model of bank …nance into a simple general equilibrium model of the determination of equilibrium interest rates. The results
show that an increase in the supply of savings (or a fall in the demand for investment) reduces interest rates and interest rate spreads, increases the relative size of the originate-todistribute (shadow) banking system, and increases the probability of failure of the originateto-hold (traditional) banks. These results provide a consistent explanation of a number of stylized facts of the period preceding the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis; see, for example, Brunnermeier (2009) . They also provide an explanation of the way in which changes leading to a reduction in the equilibrium real rate of interest, as those noted by Summers (2014) ,
can be linked to an increase in …nancial instability.
Extensions
This section analyzes three extensions of our general equilibrium model. First, we consider what happens if only originate-to-distribute banks can expand following the increase in the aggregate supply of savings. The implicit assumption is that originate-to-hold banks are subject to some constraints that slow down their adjustment to the new environment. In this way, we intend to shed light on the possible di¤erences between the short-and long-run e¤ects of a savings glut. Second, we introduce risk-averse instead of risk-neutral investors.
This will allow us to distinguish the e¤ects of a change in the supply of savings from those of a change in investors'risk appetite. Finally, we consider a variation of the model in which the riskiest entrepreneurs may not be able to fund their projects. In this setup, a savings glut will have a new extensive margin e¤ect, due to the shift in the upper bound of the range of entrepreneurs that get funded.
Short-vs long-run e¤ects of a savings glut
Suppose that we start from an initial equilibrium corresponding to an aggregate supply of savings w, and consider the e¤ect of an increase w in w when originate-to-hold banks cannot increase the size x p of their lending. Thus, the increase in savings will have to be accommodated by originate-to-distribute banks. This assumption may be justi…ed by introducing some (unmodeled) adjustment costs that make it di¢ cult for originate-to-hold banks to quickly increase their size.
The increase in the size of originate-to-distribute banks leads to a reduction in their loan rates, while the rates charged by originate-to-hold banks remain …xed at R p = R(x p ): Since the safe rate goes down, interest rates spreads increase for originate-to-hold banks. This will induce them to choose a higher monitoring intensity, which will reduce the risk of their portfolio. Thus, in the short-run originate-to-hold banks will be safer.
The new marginal type p will be determined by the condition
The left-hand-side of this expression is the originate-to-distribute loan rate for entrepreneurs of type p corresponding to the new safe rate R 0 ; while the right-hand-side is the …xed originate-to-hold loan rate for entrepreneurs of type p: Then, the new equilibrium safe rate R 0 is obtained by solving the market-clearing condition Z p 0 x p dp + Z 1 p x p dp = w + w:
The …rst term in the left-hand-side of (24) is the total amount of lending by banks that originate-to-distribute, where x p solves the zero pro…t condition
The second term in the left-hand-side of (24) is the total amount of lending by originate-tohold banks, which by assumption maintain their initial lending x p : Figure 3 shows the short-run e¤ects of an increase in the aggregate supply of savings w for the same parameterization used in Section 3. As before, equilibrium variables before the change are indicated with a star and represented by solid lines, while equilibrium variables after the change are indicated with two stars and represented by dashed lines. The horizontal axis of the four panels represents the entrepreneurs'types p.
Panel A shows the e¤ect on equilibrium loan rates. The increase in w leads to a reduction in rates from R p to R p but only for entrepreneurs funded by banks that originate-todistribute. Entrepreneurs funded by banks that originate-to-hold will not experience any change in their loan rates.
Panel B shows the e¤ect on equilibrium investment allocations. The increase in w shifts the position of the marginal type from p to p , and shifts upwards the function x p to x p for entrepreneurs in the new originate-to-distribute region. The total amount of lending by banks that originate-to-distribute increases by more than the increase in the aggregate supply of savings, while the total amount of lending by banks that originate-to-hold decreases. Hence, in the short-run a savings glut leads to a large expansion of the shadow banking system and a contraction of the traditional banking system. Panel C shows the e¤ects on equilibrium spreads. The results on loan rates imply that interest rate spreads will go down for types below p that were originally borrowing from originate-to-distribute banks, and will go up for types above p that remain borrowing from originate-to-hold banks. Consequently, spreads in the middle range that moves from originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute will switch from lower to higher at some point in this range.
Finally, Panel D shows the e¤ect on equilibrium probabilities of bank failure. Banks that originate-to-distribute will be lending to some riskier entrepreneurs that were funded before by originate-to-hold banks, so they will be originating riskier loans. On the other hand, banks that originate-to-hold will be able to borrow at the lower rate R 0 , so they will enjoy higher spreads, R p R 0 : This will induce them to choose a higher monitoring intensity m p .
Consequently their probability of failure will go down.
Thus, when banks that originate-to-hold cannot increase their balance sheet (and adjust their loan rates) in response to a savings glut, there will be a greater increase in the size of the shadow banking system, a greater reduction in the safe rate, and wider spreads for the traditional banks, so they will become safer. The assumption of a …xed size may be rationalized in terms of some capacity constraint that cannot be immediately relaxed. For example, we could assume that originate-to-hold banks are subject to a regulation that requires them to fund a fraction of their lending with equity capital, and that it takes some time to raise the capital required for any additional lending. But the e¤ect will only be temporary, and as soon as they are able to relax the constraint they will have a much higher probability of failure, as shown by our previous results.
The results in this section show that to get an increases in the risk of failure of originateto-hold banks it is essential that the savings glut be accompanied by what Shin (2012) calls a banking glut, that is an increase in the size of the traditional banking system. This provides a possible rationale for the use of (macroprudential) policies that slow down credit growth by traditional banks in order to deal with the impact on …nancial stability of changes in equilibrium interest rates. As noted by Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011) , such policies should take into account the impact they might have on the shadow banking system. However, a formal analysis of these issues requires a normative perspective that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Risk-averse investors
Our modeling so far has assumed that investors are risk-neutral. We now consider what happens when they are risk-averse. Speci…cally, consider a simple setup in which there is a continuum of measure w of atomistic investors with unit wealth that can be invested in only one bank (so we do not allow any portfolio diversi…cation). Since each investor has a unit wealth, the measure of investors w is equal to the aggregate supply of savings.
We assume that investors have a constant relative risk aversion utility function. Given that bank assets can yield a zero return, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is restricted to be between zero and one. Thus, we have
where 1: Risk-neutrality corresponds to the limit case = 1:
As in our baseline model, in equilibrium investors have to be indi¤erent between funding banks lending to di¤erent types of entrepreneurs. This implies that in the de…nition of an optimal contract between a bank lending to entrepreneurs of type p and the risk-averse investors, the participation constraint (6) becomes
which may be rewritten as
Notice that the investors'expected payo¤ satis…es
so they require positive risk premia.
Substituting the participation constraint (26) into the …rst-order condition (7) gives
As before, the function in left-hand side of (27) is convex in m p : Let R p denote the minimum value of this function. Then, we can follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 to show that bank …nance is feasible if R R p : In such case, the optimal contract between the bank and the investors is given by
Thus, we have essentially the same characterization of the optimal contract as in the risk-neutral case analyzed in Section 2. The di¤erence is that the convex function in the left-hand side of (27) is increasing in ; so risk aversion makes it more di¢ cult to ensure the feasibility of bank …nance.
Following the same steps as in Section 3, we can characterize the equilibrium of the model with risk-averse investors. In this equilibrium, the marginal type is given by
Notice that p is decreasing in the safe rate R 0 (as before) and also in the risk-aversion parameter : Thus, risk-aversion increases the value of monitoring and consequently the comparative advantage of originate-to-hold banks. Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of a reduction in the investors'risk aversion from = 2 to = 1 (risk-neutrality) for the same parameterization used in Section 3. As before, equilibrium variables before the change are indicated with a star and represented by solid lines, while equilibrium variables after the change are indicated with two stars and represented by dashed lines. The horizontal axis of the four panels represents the entrepreneurs'types p.
Panel A shows the e¤ect on equilibrium loan rates. The reduction in risk aversion shifts the investors'preferences toward riskier assets, so loan rates go down for riskier entrepreneurs and increase for safer entrepreneurs. In particular, the safe rate will go up from R 0 to R 0 :
The increase in the safe rate together with the reduction in loan rates for riskier entrepreneurs reduces the comparative advantage of originate-to-hold banks, which explains the shift in the position of the marginal type from p to p :
Panel B shows the e¤ect on equilibrium investment allocations. The reduction in risk aversion produces a redistribution in the allocation of savings toward riskier entrepreneurs.
Since the aggregate supply of savings is …xed, this means that investment in safer projects falls. However, the shift in the position of the marginal type from p to p implies that the e¤ect on the relative size of the shadow banking system is ambiguous. Panel C shows the e¤ects on equilibrium spreads. The results on loan rates imply that interest rate spreads go down from R p R 0 to R p R 0 : This reduces the incentives to monitor and hence increases the probability of failure of originate-to-hold banks, which is shown in Panel D. As in the case of a savings glut, a reduction in risk-aversion has an extensive margin e¤ect due to the shift of originate-to-distribute banks toward riskier borrowers (shown by the horizontal arrow), and an intensive margin e¤ect due to the reduction in the intensity of monitoring by originate-to-hold banks (shown by the vertical arrow).
These results illustrate the di¤erences between the e¤ects of a savings glut from the e¤ects of a reduction in the investors' risk appetite. Both changes lead to a reduction in interest rate spreads and an increase in the probability of failure of originate-to-hold banks, but there are some signi…cant di¤erences. A savings glut increases funding for all types of entrepreneurs and the size of the shadow banking system, while a fall in risk aversion reduces funding for safer entrepreneurs and has an ambiguous e¤ect on the size of the shadow banking system. A simple way to empirically distinguish the two changes is to look at the e¤ect on the equilibrium safe rate: it goes down in the case of a savings glut and it goes up in the case of a reduction in risk aversion.
Endogenous range of entrepreneurs'types
One feature of the numerical illustration of the baseline model and the extensions considered so far is that the full range [0; 1] of entrepreneurs' types is funded by either originate-todistribute or originate-to-hold banks. This follows from the fact that the inverse demand for loans R(x p ) = ( x p ) 1= is such that lim xp!0 R(x p ) = +1; so funding very risky projects may be pro…table when investment in them is arbitrarily small.
We next consider what happens when the inverse demand for loans R(x p ) is bounded. A simple way to do this is by changing the previous functional to
where > 0: In this case, one can show that there is a critical type p such that entrepreneurs of types riskier than p will not be able to borrow. Figure 5 shows the e¤ects of an increase in the aggregate supply of savings w for the case in which the relationship between the success return R p and the aggregate investment of entrepreneurs of type p is given by (28). As before, equilibrium variables before the change are indicated with a star and represented by solid lines, while equilibrium variables after the change are indicated with two stars and represented by dashed lines. The horizontal axis of the four panels represents the entrepreneurs'types p. The results in Panels A-D are similar to those in the corresponding panels of Figure 2 , except for the fact that the increase in the supply of savings has a new extensive margin e¤ect (shown by the second horizontal arrow), moving the riskiest type that will be funded from p to p : Thus, in this setup a savings glut makes it possible for some riskier entrepreneurs to be funded.
Endogenous Booms and Busts
We have so far analyzed the equilibrium of a static model for a given aggregate supply of savings and shown how an exogenous change in this supply a¤ects the risk of the banking system. This section analyzes a dynamic extension of the static model in which investors are in…nitely lived and the aggregate supply of savings is endogenous. Speci…cally, the supply of savings at any date is the outcome of agents'decisions at the previous date together with the realization of a systematic risk factor that a¤ects the return of entrepreneurs'projects.
The dynamic model generates endogenous booms and busts. The intuition is straightforward: the accumulation of savings leads to a reduction in interest rates and interest rate spreads and an increase in risk-taking that eventually materializes in a bust, which reduces savings, increasing interest rates and interest rate spreads and reducing risk-taking, starting again the process of wealth accumulation that leads to a boom.
At each date t there is a continuum of one-period-lived entrepreneurs of types p 2 [0; 1]
that have investment projects that can only be funded by banks. As before, we assume that banking sector is contestable and that there is a single bank that lends to entrepreneurs of type p at date t; choosing the monitoring intensity m pt 2 [0; p]: The project of an entrepreneur of type p yields at date t a return R pt = R(x pt ) with probability p and zero with probability 1 p + m pt ; where x pt denotes the aggregate investment of entrepreneurs of type p at date t; and R(x) is given by (12).
At each date t there is a continuum of measure w t of in…nitely-lived risk-neutral atomistic investors with unit wealth. Investors have a discount factor 2 (0; 1) and the period utility function is given by u(c t ) = c t : These investors fund the banks which in turn fund the entrepreneurs' projects. To simplify the presentation, we assume that banks are run by penniless one-period-lived bankers that consume the pro…ts that they may obtain before they die. Thus, banks have no equity capital and bank pro…ts do not contribute to the accumulation of wealth.
To describe the dynamics of wealth accumulation we need a model of the realization of project returns. We will maintain the assumption that the returns of the projects of entrepreneurs of each type p are perfectly correlated, but will assume that project returns are correlated across types. Speci…cally, we will use the single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002) in which the outcome of the projects of entrepreneurs of type p is driven by the realization of a latent random variable
where z t is a systematic risk factor that a¤ects all types of entrepreneurs, " pt is an idiosyncratic risk factor that only a¤ects the projects of entrepreneurs of type p; 2 (0; 1) is a parameter that determines the extent of correlation in the returns of the projects of entrepreneurs of di¤erent types, ( ) denotes the cdf of a standard normal random variable, and 1 ( ) its inverse. It is assumed that z t and " pt are standard normal random variables, independently distributed from each other as well as, in the case of " pt ; across types. They are also independent over time. The projects of entrepreneurs of type p fail at date t when y pt < 0: Hence, their probability of failure is
The dynamic behavior of aggregate wealth is then given by
where (p m pt ; z t ) = Pr(y pt 0 j z t ) = p z t 1 (p m pt ) p 1 :
The integrand in the right-hand side of (30) is the conditional (on the realization of the systematic risk factor z t ) probability of success of the projects of entrepreneurs of type p at date t multiplied by the payment to investors in case of success, which is equal to the product of the investment x pt by the interest rate at which they lend to the corresponding bank, B pt . Since the systematic risk factor z t is a random variable, the dynamic behavior of aggregate wealth will also be random.
For expositional purposes we assume that investors can either consume their unit wealth, invest it in the bank lending to entrepreneurs of type p = 0; or invest it in the bank lending to entrepreneurs of an arbitrary type p > 0: 9 Let s 0 2 [0; 1] and s p 2 [0; 1] denote the amounts invested in the two banks, and c = 1 s 0 s p 2 [0; 1] the amount consumed. The Bellman equation is then given by v(w t ) = max
Since lim x!0 R(x) = 1; in equilibrium we must have s 0 > 0 and s p > 0: Then, di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (32) with respect to s 0 and s 1 , equating to zero the resulting expressions, and subtracting one from the other, gives the following condition
This condition states that investors must be indi¤erent between lending to the two banks.
In equilibrium it must be the case that v(w) 1; since the investor can always set s 0 = s p = 0; consuming all her wealth, which gives u(1) = 1: It must also be the case that 
Clearly, we have v(w) = 1 for all w b w: Thus, when w < b w the value of one unit of wealth is greater than one and investors do not consume, while when w b w the value of one unit of wealth is equal to one and they invest b w and devote the di¤erence w b w to consumption.
Hence, the aggregate consumption of investors is given by
Substituting the indi¤erence condition (33) into the Bellman equation (32) gives
which implies the fundamental pricing equation
where v(w t+1 )=v(w t ) is the stochastic discount factor. Given that the expected value of the stochastic discount factor equals the inverse of safe rate R 0t , and that E [ (p m pt ; z t )] = Pr(y pt 0) = 1 p + m pt ; we have
so the pricing equation (37) implies
Now since w t+1 = G(w t ; z t ) and (p m pt ; z t ) are both increasing in the systematic risk factor z t ; and v 0 (w t+1 ) 0; with strict inequality for low values of w t+1 ; we conclude that the covariance term is negative, which implies
for all p > 0: Thus, investors require positive risk premia for funding the risky banks. In other words, they behave as if they were risk-averse.
Following the same steps as in the analysis of the static model in Section 3, and solving for B pt in (33), one can show that banks lending to entrepreneurs of types p > 0 will set the lowest feasible loan rate, which is given by
Notice that in the static model we have v(w t+1 ) = 1; which implies E [ (p m pt ; z t )v(w t+1 )] = 1 p + m pt ; so (38) becomes (13).
We are now ready to de…ne an equilibrium, which requires to specify the investment x pt of the di¤erent types of entrepreneurs, and hence the rates R pt = R(x pt ) at which they will borrow from the banks, the rates B pt at which the banks will borrow from the investors, and their monitoring intensity m pt . All these variables depend on the wealth w t of the investors, which is the state variable of the dynamic model. The equilibrium also requires to specify the value function of the investors v(w t ); their aggregate consumption decision c(w t ); and the dynamics of wealth accumulation.
Formally, an equilibrium is an array
2. Banks'lending rates R p (w t ) equal the lowest feasible rates R pt in (38) x p (w t ) dp = w t c(w t ):
We can illustrate the equilibrium of the dynamic model using the parameterization in Section 3. 10 An interesting result that also obtains here with the quadratic monitoring cost function (2) is that there exists a marginal type p t such that banks lending to entrepreneurs of types p p t will originate-to-distribute, setting m pt = 0; and banks lending to types p > p t will originate-to-hold, setting m pt = p p t : This implies p m p = p ; so all banks that originate-to-hold have the same probability of failure, which equals the type p t of the marginal entrepreneur. 11 10 We assume a discount factor = 0:96 and a correlation parameter = 0:15: 11 To prove this result, suppose that the solution to (38) for some p is such that m pt > 0: Then, m pt satis…es the …rst-order condition The indi¤erence condition (33) and the condition (38) that characterizes equilibrium loan rates imply
Hence, banks' lending and borrowing rates, R pt and B pt ; coincide for p p t ; that is for banks that originate-to-distribute, and satisfy R pt > B pt for p > p t ; that is for banks that originate-to-hold. In this case, as discussed in Section 3, the intermediation margin R pt B pt covers the monitoring cost and leaves some positive pro…ts for the banks.
Panel A of Figure 6 shows the value function v(w); which is decreasing and convex for w < b w; and satis…es v(w) = 1 for w b w: As noted above, the fact that v 0 (w) 0; with strict inequality for low values of w; implies the existence of positive risk premia, like in the static model with risk-averse investors analyzed in Section 4.2. The positive risk premia opens up interest rate spreads, increasing the value of monitoring and consequently the comparative advantage of originate-to-hold banks.
But given the functional form of (p m pt ; z t ) in (31), it follows that this condition is also satis…ed for any p p t (so that the corresponding m pt = p p t 0): Moreover, for the same reason, there cannot be an interior solution for p < p t ; which proves the result. Figure 6 illustrates this e¤ect by comparing, for di¤erent values of the state variable w; the marginal type p for the dynamic model (solid line) with that of the static model with risk-neutral investors (dashed line). The former is everywhere below the latter, except for low values of w when p = 0 in both models. This means that the dynamic model features a smaller relative size of the originate-to-distribute banking system, and a lower probability of failure of the originate-to-hold banks. In other words, the forward-looking behavior of investors contributes to the stability of the banking system.
Panel B of
The dynamic model yields a number of potentially testable relationships between aggregate variables. In order to highlight some of these relationships, in what follows we consider a sample realization of the (iid) systematic risk factor z t and look at the corresponding evolution of investors'wealth w t over time together some interesting variables. The black line of Panels A-D of Figure 7 represents w t , and is measured in the left-hand-side axis, and the horizontal dashed line shows the value b w above which investors consume w t b w:
In Panel A the dark grey line plots the total amount of lending by (traditional) banks that originate-to-hold, that is R 1 p t
x p (w t ) dp; and the light grey line plots the total amount of lending by (shadow) banks that originate-to-distribute, that is R p t 0 x p (w t ) dp: Although lending by both traditional and shadow banks is positively correlated with investors'wealth, most of the variation in w t is channeled through shadow banks. In other words, the shadow banking system is highly procyclical, a result that is consistent with the evidence in Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2012) that shows that shadow bank liabilities grew much faster than traditional banking liabilities in the run-up to the crisis, and contracted substantially following the 2007 peak.
The grey lines in Panel B show the evolution of the risk premia (1 p + m pt )B pt R 0t ; measured in percentage points in the right-hand axis, for two types p = 0:05 (light grey) and p = 0:1 (dark grey) that are always funded by shadow banks. Risk premia are negatively correlated with w t ; and are higher for the riskier type. The fact that risk premia go down when wealth accumulates means that the dynamic model yields countercyclical risk premia.
Thus, investors behave as if they were less risk-averse (or have greater risk appetite) during …nancial booms, although their underlying (risk-neutral) preferences do not change.
Figure 7. Model dynamics
The black line in all panels shows the dynamic evolution of investors' wealth for a sample realization of the systematic risk factor, and the dashed line shows the threshold level of wealth above which investors consume. Panel A plots the total amount of lending by traditional banks (dark grey) and shadow banks (light grey), Panel B the risk premia for investors in two di¤erent shadow banks, Panel C the probability of failure of the traditional banks, and Panel D the safe rate (in net terms).
The grey line in Panel C shows the evolution of the type p t of the marginal entrepreneur, measured in the right-hand axis. This variable is positively correlated with w t : Thus, in line with the results of the static model, higher wealth increases the relative size of the shadow banking system, and increases the probability of failure of the traditional banks.
Finally, the grey line in Panel D shows the evolution of the safe rate R 0t ; measured in net terms in the right-hand axis. This variable is negatively correlated with w t : Moreover, the safe rate can be below the discount rate 1= and even become negative in booms. 12 The intuition is that the expectation of positive returns in the future (when the economy is hit by a negative shock and wealth is very valuable) makes investors willing to forgo current consumption, which lowers the safe rate.
As previously explained, the rationale for the observed dynamics is as follows: good realizations of the systematic risk factor result in higher aggregate wealth which reduces interest rates and interest rate spreads, increases the size of the shadow banking system, and increases the probability of failure of the traditional banks, making the banking system especially vulnerable to a bad realization of the systematic risk factor. Therefore, our model provides a framework for understanding the emergence of endogenous boom and bust cycles, as well as the procyclical nature of the shadow banking system, the existence of countercyclical risk premia, and the low levels of interest rates and interest rate spreads during booms.
Conclusion
This paper presents a general equilibrium model of the connection between real interest rates, credit spreads, and the structure and the risk of the banking system. Banks intermediate between a heterogeneous set of entrepreneurs and a set of investors characterized by a …xed aggregate supply of savings. We assume that all agents are risk-neutral and that banks can monitor entrepreneurs'projects at a cost, but this is not observed by investors. This moral hazard problem is the key friction that drives the results of the model. We also assume that project returns are decreasing in the aggregate investment of entrepreneurs of each type, and that the market for lending to entrepreneurs is contestable.
We …rst characterize the equilibrium of the model, showing that safer entrepreneurs will be funded by banks that do not monitor their projects and riskier entrepreneurs by banks that monitor them. We assume that monitoring requires keeping the loans in the banks'books, and for this reason we associate nonmonitoring banks with intermediaries that originate-to-distribute (called shadow banks) and monitoring banks with intermediaries that 12 Notice that for w t b w we have v(w t ) = 1 and E [v(w t+1 )] > 1; so (36) implies R 0t < 1; i.e. R 0t < 1= : originate-to-hold (called traditional banks). We then analyze the e¤ects of an increase in the supply of savings, showing that it will lead to a reduction in interest rates and interest rate spreads, an expansion of the relative size of the shadow banking system, and a reduction in the monitoring intensity and hence an increase in the probability of failure of the traditional banks.
We extend our static model to a dynamic setup in which the aggregate supply of savings at any date is the outcome of agents' decisions at the previous date together with the realization of a systematic risk factor that a¤ects the return of entrepreneurs'projects. The dynamic model generates endogenous booms and busts: the accumulation of savings leads to a reduction in interest rates and interest rate spreads and an increase in risk-taking that eventually materializes in a bust, which reduces savings, starting again the process of wealth accumulation that leads to a boom. The model also yields a number of empirically relevant results such as the procyclical nature of the shadow banking system, the existence of countercyclical risk premia, and the low levels of interest rates and interest rate spreads leading to the buildup of risks during booms.
These results provide a theoretical explanation for the relationship noted by Rajan (2005) between high savings, low real interest rates, and the incentives of …nancial intermediaries to search for yield. They also rationalize the way in which changes leading to a reduction in real interest rates, as those noted by Summers (2014) , can be associated with an increase in …nancial instability. Moreover, the results provide a rationale for a number of empirical facts in the run-up of the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis.
We would like to conclude with a number of remarks. First, our model builds on the assumption that banks monitor their borrowers, an idea that traces back to the seminal work of Diamond (1984) . 13 Still, a similar story could be constructed if banks increase the quality its pool of loan applicants by screening them. 14 Second, the paper entirely focuses on debt …nance, abstracting from the possibility of funding the banks with (inside) equity. Since equity …nance would strengthen the banks' monitoring incentives, adding this possibility would require the introduction of a di¤erential cost of equity. 15 Third, we only provide a positive analysis of the connection between real interest rates and …nancial stability, without analyzing the (constrained) e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocations, which would merit a separate paper. Finally, it is important to stress that we have constructed a model without any nominal frictions, so monetary policy is completely absent from our story of search for yield. Introducing nominal frictions would allow to study the connection between monetary policy and …nancial stability, a topic that would also merit a separate paper.
15 See Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2015) for a model along these lines that is used to discuss the e¤ects of di¤erent types of bank capital requirements.
for either m = m or m = 0 (when m > 0).
Finally, to prove that the bank's participation constraint (5) Proof of Proposition 3 To prove that higher types p will be characterized by higher spreads R p R 0 we simply di¤erentiate (15) and apply the envelope theorem to (16). To prove that higher types p > b p will be characterized by higher monitoring m p we di¤erentiate the …rst-order condition (17) and use the assumption c 000 (m) 0:
To prove that increases in the safe rate R 0 lead to increases in the spreads R p R 0 for p b p note that (15) implies R p R 0 = pR 0 1 p ; so spreads are linear in R 0 : To prove that increases in the safe rate R 0 lead to increases in the spreads R p R 0 for p > b p we apply the envelope theorem to (16), which gives d(R p R 0 ) dR 0 = 1 1 p + m p 1 = p m p 1 p + m p > 0:
Finally, to prove that monitoring m p is increasing in the safe rate R 0 for p > b p we di¤erentiate the …rst-order condition (17) and use the assumption c 000 (m) 0:
